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VI. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION AND ALL WRITS ACTS
IN COMPLEX LITIGATION*
A. Introduction
It should be evident by now that there is a lot at stake for all the
parties to civil litigation in the determination of whether to proceed
in state or federal court. Nowhere is this issue more hotly contested
than in the context of multi-district class action litigation. The ability
to proceed in federal court versus state court has tremendous
implications for both the plaintiffs and the defendants in these
actions.1  Once a state or federal court has seemingly retained
jurisdiction over a class action, however, the fight over the forum is
not necessarily over. The last twenty years have seen a steady
increase of competition between state and federal courts over
jurisdiction to issue a fimal judgment or reach a settlement in these
class actions. Specifically, there have been competing state court
class actions that threaten to frustrate resolution of parallel class
actions in federal district courts that are close to reaching settlement.
* Joshua J. Wes: J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Loyola Law School; M.A.,
Biola University, 2002; B.A., Biola University, 2000. To my family,
especially my parents Jim and Cindy Wes, for the love, support, and
encouragement that has enabled me to achieve so much.
1. See supra Part I; see also Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591 (1997) (striking down a class action settlement in ongoing asbestos
litigation); Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum Selection and
Concurrent Federal State Jurisdiction: Supplemental Jurisdiction; Diversity
Jurisdiction; Removal, Preemption; Venue; Transfer of Venue; Personal
Jurisdiction; Abstention and the All Writs Act, in 1 ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY MATERIALS: CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 221, 365 (2003) (noting that after Amchem there
has been a "chilly reception" to mass tort class actions in federal courts,
prompting movement of many mass tort and other state law based class actions
to state court). See generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federal Courts Should
Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity
Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483 (2000) (noting the explosion
of and problems with class action suits in state courts and calling for reforms
that would give federal courts jurisdiction over more of such cases).
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This article will help a plaintiffs class action lawyer determine
the extent to which she can successfully institute an action in state
court if unhappy with the federal district court proceedings.
Similarly it will help a defendant's lawyer understand the power a
federal district court may have to protect class action settlements in
which the court has already invested significant time and resources.
The forum where the settlement or judgment is ultimately entered
may significantly impact the class recovery.
Federal courts have used the All Writs Act to enjoin actual or
threatened conflicting parallel state court proceedings in complex
class action litigation. The Anti-Injunction Act,3 which is rooted in
the federalism principle that the federal government should stay out
of state affairs, is a congressionally imposed limit on this broad grant
of authority. It is therefore necessary to understand what the All
Writs and Anti-Injunction Acts are and how the policy of federalism
has impacted their interpretation by the courts.
Section B of this article will provide background on the problem
of parallel or threatened parallel state court proceedings in multi-
district class action litigation. Permeating these issues is the strong
policy of federalism, reflected by the Anti-Injunction Act, which
embodies a presumption in favor of permitting parallel actions in
state and federal courts.
Section C will closely examine two of the foundational cases
examining the use of and policies underlying the Anti-Injunction and
All Writs Acts. This background is essential in understanding how
recent appellate court decisions upholding the use of the All Writs
Act by federal district courts to enjoin parallel state court
proceedings deviates from the way the Supreme Court has
historically characterized the purpose and function of both the Anti-
Injunction Act and the All Writs Act.
Section D will look closely at In re Baldwin-United Corp.4 and
In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation,5 which illustrate the
use of the All Writs Act to effect a broader reading of the limits
imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act. It will then turn to a more
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
3. Id. at § 2283.
4. 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985).
5. 282 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2002).
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detailed analysis of how Congress's federalism concerns in enacting
the Anti-Injunction Act may be frustrated by the current uses of the
All Writs Act. Further, it will consider why the Supreme Court has
thus far declined to grant certiorari in these cases, and how the Court
might rule if it did take up the issue. Finally, Section D will consider
recent legislative efforts that may further empower federal courts to
preserve their interests in the face of parallel state proceedings that
threaten a federal court's jurisdiction over multi-district class actions.
B. Background
The problem of parallel state court proceedings undermining a
federal court's ability to achieve global settlements in multi-district
class action litigation has arisen in the contexts of mass torts,
6
7 8securities, and consumer protection. Federal courts have used the
All Writs Act to enjoin state court proceedings on the theory that
such injunctions are necessary in aid of their jurisdiction. The Anti-
Injunction Act is a limitation on a federal court's ability to issue such
injunctions. Understanding how these acts were meant to work and
how they have been interpreted by the courts is therefore necessary
for a party to determine whether she can proceed in the forum of her
choice, be it state or federal. Part 1 of this section introduces the
Anti-Injunction and All Writs Acts themselves. Part 2 introduces the
competing policy concerns of federalism and efficiency, which
respectively underlie the Anti-Injunction Act and the All Writs Act.
Part 3 examines the fact patterns of two cases, In re Baldwin-United
Corp.9 and In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation,10 which
illustrate two situations in which a federal court might use the Anti-
6. See, e.g., id.; Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir.
1993); Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993).
7. See, e.g., White v. Nat'l Football League, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994);
In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985).
8. See, e.g., Miller v. Brooks (In re Am. Honda Motor Co. Dealerships
Relations Litig.), 315 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003); In re Factor VIII or IX
Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1998); Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998).
9. 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985).
10. 282 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2002).
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Injunction and All Writs Acts to enjoin parallel state court
proceedings that threaten federal jurisdiction.
1. The Anti-Injunction & All Writs Acts
Understanding the Anti-Injunction and All Writs Acts is critical
to knowing whether class action plaintiffs must proceed in federal
court when a case has been filed or removed there or whether they
can file parallel actions in plaintiff friendly state courts that have
concurrent jurisdiction. On the flip side, a class action defendant
needs to know whether she can count on the soundness of federal
settlement proceedings or judgments in the face of actual or
threatened parallel state court proceedings.
Under the All Writs Act, federal courts "may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law."' 1 This broad grant of
authority is limited by the Anti-Injunction Act, which bars a federal
court from enjoining a proceeding in a state court unless that action
is "expressly authorized by [an] Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
12
The Anti-Injunction Act represents an absolute prohibition against a
federal court enjoining state court proceedings, unless one of the
three statutory exceptions applies.
13
The All Writs Act contains the same language as the second
of the three exceptions in the Anti-Injunction Act, and the
parallel "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" language is
construed similarly in both statutes. Together the All Writs
Act and the Anti-Injunction Act govern whether a district
court can properly enjoin state court litigation pending at
the time injunctive relief is requested.
14
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
12. Id. at § 2283.
13. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286
(1970).
14. Newby v. Enron Corp., 338 F.3d 467, 474 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).
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2. Federalism vs. efficiency
An analysis of how federal courts use the All Writs and Anti-
Injunction Acts to respond to the problem of threatened or actual
parallel state court proceedings frustrating a federal court's ability to
reach a global settlement necessitates consideration of the competing
policy concerns of federalism and efficiency. Federalism represents
the idea that the federal government should not interfere in areas that
are traditionally left to the states.15 In the context of our nation's
dual state and federal court system, federalism applies to limit a
federal court's ability to interfere with state court proceedings. Since
federalism is a policy concern rather than an applicable law, it can be
overridden if it conflicts with a more compelling competing concern.
In the context of complex class action litigation, many federal courts
have begun to recognize efficiency as a competing policy concern
that is compelling enough to override the federalist proscription
against federal court interference with state court proceedings.'
6
Federalism is the policy underlying the Anti-Injunction Act,
which strictly limits a federal court's ability to enjoin state court
proceedings. When the United States was established as a nation, the
states surrendered some of their sovereign power to the national
government, but retained much of it.17 One of the powers the states
retained was the maintenance of their own judicial systems.' 8 On the
federal level, the Constitution created the Supreme Court and
empowered Congress to create a system of lower federal courts.'
9
The Supreme Court has the power to directly review state court
cases, while the lower federal courts do not have that power.20 With
the establishment of essentially separate state and federal legal
systems it was necessary to work out "lines of demarcation" between
the systems as litigants sought to invoke the power of the court in
15. See Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 11-23 (2003) (examining the
New Federalism focus of the current Supreme Court and considering areas that
have been seen as being properly left to state power).
16. See infra Part VI.D. 1.
17. Atd. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 285.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 286.
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which they thought they had the best chance of success. 2 1 The Anti-
Injunction Act, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining state
court proceedings unless one of the three statutory exceptions
applies, was enacted by Congress to draw such a line of
demarcation.22  The Act represents such a strong policy of
noninterference between federal and state courts that there is a
presumption in favor of permitting parallel state actions to proceed.23
While the Anti-Injunction Act embodies the policy of
federalism, the All Writs Act can be seen as representing the policy
of efficiency. The Act allows a federal court to issue all writs
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction in order to make the most efficient
use of its judicial resources. 24  It allows a federal court to take
affirmative action aimed at protecting its jurisdiction, thus achieving
the "rational ends of law."25 There is necessarily a conflict between
federalism and efficiency; therefore, there is a conflict between the
Anti-Injunction Act and the All Writs Act. Federalism and the Anti-
Injunction Act require federal courts to steer clear of interference
with parallel state court proceedings, while efficiency and the All
Writs Act invite federal courts to do what they can to reach a just
global resolution. In theory the Anti-Injunction Act operates as a
limit on the broad grant of authority conferred by the All Writs Act.26
Thus, in order for a writ issued under the All Writs Act to be a valid
exercise of federal court power, it must first meet one of the three
exceptions prescribed by Congress under the Anti-Injunction Act.
27
21. Id.
22. Id. While the Anti-Injunction Act limits a federal court's ability to
enjoin state court proceedings, it does allow injunctions in limited situations.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has ruled that state courts are almost
never allowed to enjoin federal proceedings. See Donovan v. City of Dallas,
377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964) (holding that state courts may not enjoin federal
courts except in the limited situation where an injunction is issued to protect
jurisdiction over property already in the state court's custody and control);
Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) (holding that state
courts may not bar removal to federal court).
23. AtL Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 296-97.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
25. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969).
26. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir.
2002); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355,
364-67 (3d Cir. 2001).
27. See Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 233; Prudential, 261 F.3d at 364-67.
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In other words, while efficiency concerns are important, they must
not be so elevated as to undermine federalism.
3. Illustration of the problem of parallel state court proceedings
jeopardizing a federal court's jurisdiction
The problem of state court proceedings threatening to derail a
federal court's judgment or settlement can arise when parallel state
court proceedings are merely threatened or when such parallel
litigation is actually underway. Baldwin-United and Diet Drugs
illustrate situations where a federal court might use the Anti-
Injunction and All Writs Acts when faced with the danger that a
threatened or an actual state court proceeding jeopardizes its
jurisdiction.
a. threatened parallel state court proceedings-Baldwin-United
In some cases a federal district court will have spent significant
time and resources working toward a settlement in a complex class
action suit and its jurisdiction will be put in jeopardy by threatened
parallel state court proceedings. In Baldwin-United, a federal district
court was faced with the possibility that imminent New York state
court litigation would derail its global settlement efforts. The
Multidistrict Litigation Panel consolidated the proceedings of more
than 100 federal securities lawsuits, involving approximately
100,000 plaintiffs who were holders of Baldwin single-premium
deferred annuities (SPDAs).28 The plaintiff class "asserted claims
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 against 26 broker-dealers and related individuals who sold the
SPDAs by representing them to be safe and desirable investments. 29
The claims were designed for the plaintiffs to obtain recovery over
the sum they were already due to receive under a rehabilitation plan
for Baldwin's insurance subsidiaries. 30 For two years, the district
court coordinated settlement talks between the parties and had been
successful in overseeing negotiations as to 18 of the 26 broker-dealer
defendants. 31 These defendants signed stipulations of settlement and
28. In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1985).
29. Id.
30. Id. at331-32.
31. Id. at 332.
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in order to rule on the settlements the district court provisionally
approved class status.32 Only about 50 of the approximately 100,000
plaintiffs objected to the settlement.33
Representatives of 40 states in the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG) were dissatisfied with the proposed
settlements, concluding that the proposal did not adequately
compensate plaintiffs for their federal and state law claims and that
the defendants' actions might have violated state regulatory and
criminal laws.34 The district court initially approved the settlement
and scheduled a hearing on the issue of whether the settlement was
fair.35  Subsequently, these state representatives began taking
measures that would allow them, in their representative capacity
under state law, to seek restitution and monetary recovery from
defendants. 36  After unsuccessful negotiations between state
representatives and defendants in which the states sought a higher
settlement figure in exchange for termination of the threatened state
administrative proceedings and civil litigation, 22 states submitted an
amicus brief opposing the settlement as inadequate. 37  Shortly
thereafter, several defendants received notices from the state of New
York indicating its intent to seek restitution on behalf of the New
York citizens who held Baldwin SPDAs.38  These defendants
petitioned the district court to enjoin the pending New York
actions.
39
The federal court was therefore faced with a situation where
imminent New York state court proceedings threatened to derail a
significant portion of a settlement that it had expended two years of
time and resources working to bring about. After considering in
Section C how the Anti-Injunction and All Writs Acts have been
interpreted by the Supreme Court, Section D.l.a will return to the
facts of Baldwin-United to illustrate how the federal court used the
Acts to enjoin the New York state court from acting.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 332-33.
37. Id. at 333.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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b. actual parallel state court proceedings-Diet Drugs
Baldwin-United illustrated the problem of threatened state court
proceedings impacting a federal court's ability to reach a global
settlement. Federal courts also face situations where parallel state
court proceedings have already been instituted. In Diet Drugs, a
federal district court was faced with the possibility that ongoing
Texas state court litigation would derail its global settlement efforts.
Diet Drugs involved mass tort litigation that arose from injuries
caused by American Home Products's (AHP) appetite suppressants
"Pondimin" and "Redux", which were taken by more than four
40million people between 1995 and 1997. In 1997, data surfaced
suggesting a link between use of the drugs and valvular heart
disease. 41 Approximately 18,000 individual lawsuits and over 100
class actions were filed in federal and state courts across the country
and AHP removed many of the state cases to federal court.42 The
Multidistrict Litigation Panel transferred all of the federal actions to
Judge Bechtle in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.43 Global
settlement talks with plaintiffs in the federal action and some of the
state actions began in April 1999 and a settlement agreement was
reached in November 1999, whereupon the district court entered an
order conditionally certifying a nationwide settlement class and
preliminarily approving the settlement." The deadline for class
members to opt out was March 2000. 45 After a fairness hearing in
May, the district court entered a final order certifying the class and
approving the settlement in August 2000.46
A number of state court actions were not included in the
consolidated multidistrict litigation involved in the settlement.47 One
such action was the Gonzalez class action that was filed in Texas
state court before AHP withdrew its drugs from the market and
before the Multidistrict Litigation Panel consolidated the federal
40. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2002).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 225-26.
45. Id. at 226.
46. Id.
47. See id.
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action.48 AHP originally removed the Gonzalez action to federal
court on the theory that a non-diverse defendant had been
fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction.49  It was
consolidated as part of the multidistrict litigation, but was ultimately
remanded to Texas state court in February 2000 during the opt out
period when Judge Bechtle found there to be no fraudulently joined
defendant. 50 After the case was remanded, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint dropping their class claims against the non-
diverse defendant.5' A week later the Texas court certified the
Gonzalez class of all persons who purchased AHP's drugs in Texas
and who sought economic damages.
5 2
This class certification took place eight days before the end of
the opt out period for the federal class settlement.53 At this time,
most of the members of the Gonzalez state class were also members
of the federal class.54  The Gonzalez plaintiffs took action to
eliminate this overlap by moving in the Texas state court for an order
opting out all of the unnamed members of the Gonzalez class from
the federal class. In response, AHP sought a temporary restraining
order from the federal court to prevent the Gonzalez class from
implementing a mass opt out.56 On March 23 2000, hearings were
held in both the Texas state court and Pennsylvania federal court on
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also supra Part V.B.3 (discussing fraudulently joined
defendants).
50. Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 226.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 226-27. While the Gonzalez class in the Texas state court action
sought only economic damages, which included the purchase price of the drugs
and treble damages, the federal settlement included personal injury, medical
monitoring, mental anguish and punitive damage claims in addition to the
economic damage claims. 1d. at 226-27. The only conflict therefore was over
the economic damages portion of the federal settlement. Id. For a discussion
of economic and non-economic damages in complex class action litigation, see
Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort
Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional Envelope?, 8
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1999).
53. See Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 227.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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these respective motions.57 The Texas court entered an order
partially opting out the Gonzalez class from the federal case, and the
federal court granted the temporary restraining order denying the
effect of the opt out and "order[ing] Gonzalez class counsel to refrain
from pursuing the opt out." 58  After filing a second notice of
removal, AHP moved for a permanent injunction restraining the
Texas plaintiffs from instituting a mass opt out of unnamed Texas
class members. 59
This case raised the question of whether the federal district court
had the power to issue an injunction that would prevent a state court
from taking action that threatened to frustrate the district court's
efforts to finalize a settlement that the district court had expended
significant time and resources reaching. After considering in Section
C how the Anti-Injunction and All Writs Acts have been interpreted
by the Supreme Court, Section D. 1.b will return to the facts of Diet
Drugs to examine the Third Circuit's application of the Acts to
uphold the district court injunction restraining the Texas plaintiffs
from instituting a mass opt out, and declaring that any order
purporting to affect or determine the opt out status of any member of
the federal class was invalid.
The last twenty years have seen numerous instances in which
appellate courts have used the All Writs Act as a basis for
undertaking action that would seem to be otherwise barred by the
non-interference policy of the Anti-Injunction Act. For example,
appellate courts have issued injunctions that have effectively stayed
state court proceedings. This Article focuses primarily on this type
of federal court action. Appellate courts have also used the All Writs
Act as an independent basis for removal jurisdiction, which was,
until recently, an option for federal courts. In the context of All
Writs removal, federalism policy concerns won out over the
efficiency concerns embodied in the All Writs Act.
4. The All Writs Act as an independent basis for removal
Until recently, a split existed among circuits as to the propriety
of using the All Writs Act as an independent basis for removal of
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 227-28.
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state cases to federal court.6 0 In November 2002, the United States
Supreme Court held in Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson
61
that the All Writs Act does not create original federal jurisdiction and
therefore cannot be used to remove an otherwise unremovable case.
62
In other words, the All Writs Act cannot be used to avoid complying
with the requirements of the removal statute.
63
The appellate courts upholding the use of the All Writs Act as a
basis for removal weighed the efficiency interest more heavily than
the federalism interest.64 Historically, however, the Supreme Court
has been less interested in efficiency and more interested in
upholding the federalism principles upon which the nation was
founded. This has been reflected in recent years by the Court's
federalism decisions, which have diminished federal power and
afforded more latitude to the individual states.65 Before the Court
spoke on the issue of All Writs removal in Syngenta, appellate courts
had the freedom to adopt a rule allowing for such removal, thereby
giving federal courts considerable latitude to protect their
jurisdiction. The Court's elimination of this means of protecting
federal jurisdiction may indicate that the Court will lean toward
60. Compare VMS Ltd. P'ship Sec. Litig. v. Prudential Sec. Inc. (In re
VMS Sec. Litig.), 103 F.3d 1317 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court's use
of the All Writs Act to remove and enjoin state court litigation), and Ivy v.
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996
F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's use of the All Writs Act to
remove parallel state court proceedings to prevent frustration of federal
settlement), with Malone v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) (the All
Writs Act may only be invoked in aid of jurisdiction that already exists), and
Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368 (1 lth Cir. 1998) (the All Writs
Act does not provide an independent basis of jurisdiction when federal
jurisdiction is otherwise lacking). See supra Part V for a complete discussion
of removal jurisdiction.
61. 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
62. Id. at 34.
63. Id. at 32-33. "The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and
'a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is shown for
its transfer under some act of Congress."' Id. at 32 (quoting Great N. Ry. Co.
v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280 (1918)).
64. See, e.g., In re VMS Ltd. P'ship Sec. Litig. v. Prudential Sec. Inc. (In re
VMS Sec. Litig.), 103 F.3d 1317 (7th Cir. 1996); Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994).
65. See Gamett, supra note 15.
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respecting federalism concerns over efficiency concerns in the
complex class action context.
The Supreme Court has not yet, however, spoken on whether a
district court has the ability to issue an injunction staying a parallel
state court proceeding in order to protect and effectuate its
judgments. The Court may be avoiding this issue because, in
applying basic principles of federalism, it may feel compelled to
strike the practice down as being outside the scope of what Congress
intended when it enacted the Anti-Injunction Act and the All Writs
Act. Its choice to avoid the matter may reflect a desire to reserve to
district courts additional power to protect their jurisdiction. Whether
or not the Supreme Court would uphold such practices if it chose to
hear the issue is still an open question.
66
The next section focuses on how the Court has historically
construed the Anti-Injunction and All Writs Acts, the limits the Acts
impose on federal courts, and the power the Acts grant. It is
important to have this foundation in mind before examining how the
courts have begun using the All Writs Act to aid their jurisdiction by
issuing injunctions in situations that Congress historically intended to
bar with its narrowly tailored allowance for injunctions in the Anti-
Injunction Act.
C. Law
In solving the problem of parallel state proceedings threatening
the ability of federal courts to arrive at a global settlement, the
modern trend has been to elevate efficiency policy concerns over
federalism policy concerns in interpreting the Anti-Injunction Act
and the All Writs Act. This modern reading of a federal court's
power under the Acts differs from the Supreme Court's historic
interpretation of the Acts. In the 1970s the Supreme Court issued
rulings in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers6 7 and United States v. New York Telephone
Co.,68 which illustrate the Court's historic interpretation of the Acts.
66. See infra Part VI.D.1.d (considering whether the Supreme Court's
decision not to take up this issue indicates efficiency concerns have won the
day).
67. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
68. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
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1. The Anti-Injunction Act
In Atlantic Coast Line, the Court struck down a district court
order enjoining the Atlantic Coast Railroad Company from invoking
an injunction issued by a Florida state court which prohibited
picketing by the respondent union.69 It held that the district court's
order did not meet any of the three exceptions created by Congress in
70the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides: "A court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."
71
The petitioner, Atlantic Coast Line, originally sought an
injunction in 1967 against the respondent picketers in federal district
72court, but the federal judge denied its request. Immediately
thereafter it filed for an injunction in Florida state court, which it
successfully obtained.73 Two years later, the Supreme Court issued a
decision in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co.,74 in which, on substantially similar facts, the Court
struck down a state court injunction as a violation of federal law."
The respondents in Atlantic Coast Line thereafter unsuccessfully
filed a motion in Florida state court for the dissolution of the
injunction in light of the Court's ruling in Jacksonville Terminal.
76
The respondents then went back to the federal district court
requesting an injunction against enforcement of the state court
injunction.77 The district court granted the injunction, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
ultimately holding that the district court had overstepped its
authority.
78
69. At. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 283-85.
70. Id. at 284-85.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
72. Atd. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 283.
73. Id.
74. 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
75. See Atd. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 283-84.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 284-85.
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To clarify its ruling, the Supreme Court considered Congress'
purpose in enacting the Anti-Injunction Act. 79 The Act, in part,
"stemmed from the essentially federal nature of our national
government." 80 When the nation was established under the
Constitution, the States necessarily surrendered part, but not all, of
their sovereign power to the national government. 81  One of the
powers reserved to the states was the maintenance of their own state
judicial systems.8 2 After much debate amongst the Framers about
whether a federal court system needed to be created or whether the
state courts could be entrusted to protect both state and federal rights,
they arrived at a compromise whereby the Constitution created one
Supreme Court while Congress was given the power to create a
83lower federal court system. Only the Supreme Court was given the
power to directly review cases from state courts under the
Constitution.84  Since Congress first created a system of lower
federal trial and appellate courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789,85 it
has never given these lower federal courts the power to directly
review cases from state courts. 86 With the establishment of two
essentially separate legal systems, it was inevitable that conflicts
would develop between the two systems as litigants sought to invoke
the power of the court in which they thought they had the best
chance of success, 87 "[t]hus, in order to make the dual system work
and 'to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts,' it
was necessary to work out lines of demarcation between the two
79. Id. at 285.
80. Id. For a more detailed survey of the history of the Anti-Injunction Act,
see LINDA MULLENIX ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS AND
JURISDICTION 397-99 (1998); Steven M. Larimore, Exploring the Interface
Between Rule 23 Class Actions and the Anti-Injunction Act, 18 GA. L. REV.
259, 268-271 (1984).
81. At. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 285.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 286.
85. Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20,
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
86. See At. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 285-86.
87. Id. at 286.
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systems." 88  It was against this backdrop that the original Anti-
Injunction Act was passed.89
The injunction in Atlantic Coast Line was technically directed at
the railroad rather than the Florida state court. However, the
Supreme Court recognized that the prohibition-of the Anti-Injunction
Act could not be avoided by addressing the order to the parties.
9'
The order was effectively an injunction staying Florida State court
proceedings. 92 There is a strong presumption under the Act in favor
of allowing a State court proceeding to go forward. 93 There is, in
fact, an absolute prohibition against a federal court enjoining State
court proceedings unless one of the three statutory exceptions
applies. 94 Therefore, for the injunction to be valid under the Anti-
Injunction Act, it must either have been expressly authorized by
Congress, necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction, or
issued for the purpose of protecting a prior judgment.95 The first
exception did not apply in this case, as neither party argued that
Congress had expressly authorized a federal court to issue an
injunction in this situation.
9 6
The Court found that the second exception, that the order be
necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction, also did not
88. Id. at 286 (quoting Okla. Packing Co. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 309
U.S. 4, 9 (1940)).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 287.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 287-88.
93. See id. at 297.
94. Id. at 286.
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
96. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 288. Although the Anti-Injunction Act
calls for express Congressional authorization, a federal law does not have to
contain an explicit reference to § 2283; there is "no prescribed formula."
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955).
However, in order to qualify as expressly authorized, "an Act of Congress
must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable
in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not
empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 237 (1972). For a more detailed explication of case-law interpreting the
"expressly authorized" requirement, see James P. George, Parallel Litigation,
51 BAYLOR L. REv. 769, 882-84 (1999).
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apply.97  The respondents argued that the district court acquired
jurisdiction over the controversy in 1967 when petitioners originally
asked the district court to issue an injunction against the union
picketers. They also argued that in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Jacksonville Terminal, indicating that the respondent had
a right to picket and that the state court injunction was illegitimate,
the state court had interfered with a federally protected right.
Therefore, a federal injunction was "necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction." 98 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, pointing
out that the state and federal courts in this case had concurrent
jurisdiction and neither court had the power to prevent either party
from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts.
9 9
The Court acknowledged that while the language of the
exception is broad, an injunction is necessary in aid of a court's
jurisdiction only if "some federal injunctive relief may be necessary
97. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 294-96. Some courts and
commentators have referred to the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction"
exception to § 2283 as the in rem or property exception. The idea is that the
threat posed by parallel state court proceedings of undermining a federal
judgment is most acute when jurisdiction is dependent upon a res (or property).
There is indeed a threat of rendering "'the exercise of the federal court's
jurisdiction nugatory"' if the state court issues a judgment on the same piece of
property since the property itself is necessary to satisfy any judgment in the
case. Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Martin H. Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L.
REv. 717, 754 (1977)); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 235 (1972);
Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2002). The same risk is not
inherent in most in personam cases, since satisfying a judgment does not rely
on deliverance of a particular res. Some courts, however, have found there to
be enough of a risk of rendering a federal court's jurisdiction effectively void
in an in personam case that they have allowed an injunction under this
exception to § 2283. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Amaiz, 143 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir.
1998) (allowing an injunction in order to effectuate a settlement agreement
over which the federal court had retained jurisdiction); Winkler, 101 F.3d at
1202 (threat of parallel state proceedings disrupting the orderly resolution of
the federal litigation significant enough to issue injunction in multi-district
litigation case); Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 540
(9th Cir. 1994) (injunction necessary to preserve the integrity of exclusive
federal jurisdiction). A court's interpretation of the All Writs Act may color
how broadly or narrowly it views this exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
See infra Part VI.D. 1.
98. See At. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 294.
99. Id. at 295-96.
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to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the
federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case." 100 Since
the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction, the state
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the state and federal claims at
issue "did not hinder the federal court's jurisdiction so as to make an
injunction necessary to aid that jurisdiction."'' 1 In addition, the
injunction could not be necessary in aid of jurisdiction simply
because the state court had, according to the federal court, acted
improperly under Jacksonville Terminal, because lower federal
courts do not have the power to directly review state court
decisions.'
0 2
Finally, the Court found that the third exception-to protect or
effectuate the federal court's judgments-did not apply.10 3  The
respondents argued that in making its 1967 decision not to issue the
petitioner's requested injunction, the district court determined that
the respondents had a federally protected right to protest, with which
a state court could not interfere. Therefore, the district court's
injunction was issued to protect its prior judgment.'0 4 The Supreme
Court, however, found that in 1967, the district court merely
determined that federal law could not be invoked to enjoin the
respondents from picketing; it did not determine that federal law also
precludes state regulation of picketing, which would be required for
the 1969 injunction to be necessary to protect or effectuate the 1967
100. Id. at 295.
101. Id. at 296.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 293. The third exception to § 2283 is often referred to as the
Relitigation Exception. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S.
140 (1988) (the relitigation exception authorizes a federal court to enjoin
litigation in state courts of an issue that was actually previously presented to
and decided by the federal court). The relitigation exception is designed to
permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that was previously
presented to and decided by the federal court. It is based on the concepts of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. The relitigation exception is narrower than the
doctrine of res judicata because it only protects matters that have actually been
decided by a federal court. See Selletti v. Carey, 70 Fed. Appx. 603, 604-05
(2d Cir. 2003).
104. At. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 288.
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order. 10 5 What the respondents were really trying to do was to get
the district court "to decide that the state court judge was wrong in
distinguishing the Jacksonville Terminal decision,... [but] [s]uch an
attempt to seek appellate review of a state decision... cannot be
justified as necessary 'to protect or effectuate"' the previous order
under the Anti-Injunction Act.
10 6
Despite the proscription against enjoining the actions of the
Florida state court, the Supreme Court indicated that the respondents
were not without recourse. The district court did not have the
authority to review the actions of the state court. At least
theoretically, however, the Supreme Court did.10 7  If, after the
respondents had exhausted their state court remedies, i.e., "gone up
the ladder" to the Florida Supreme Court, and were unable to obtain
relief, they could petition for hearing in the U.S. Supreme Court, the
one federal court that does have the power under the Constitution to
review state court proceedings. 0 8  This, of course, would have
involved significant time and expense in litigation. 10 9 While it would
have been easier and more efficient to allow the district court's
injunction to stand, a strict reading of the Anti-Injunction Act and its
exceptions does not allow federal courts to issue injunctions in the
name of efficiency. Indeed, the Atlantic Coast Line court
emphasized that, "since the statutory prohibition against such
injunctions in part rests on the fundamental constitutional
independence of the States and their courts, the exceptions should
not be enlarged by loose statutory construction."' 10 However, there
may be cases where the federal interest in efficiency is so strong,
such as in complex multi-district litigation, that a broader reading of
the Anti-Injunction Act might be acceptable in order to allow a
federal district court to enjoin a state court proceeding."'
105. See id. at 290.
106. Id. at 293.
107. Id. at 296.
108. See id.
109. Also, practically speaking, the Supreme Court grants certiorari on so
few cases each year that respondents were unlikely to ever get federal review.
110. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 287.
111. See infra Part VI.D. 1.
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2. The All Writs Act
Federal courts have effected such a broad reading of the Anti-
Injunction Act when interpreting the All Writs Act. In New York
Telephone Company, the Supreme Court upheld a district court
order, finding that the district court had the authority to issue the
order under the All Writs Act.' 12 The order directed the New York
Telephone Company (Company) to provide necessary facilities and
technical assistance to the FBI to implement a previous order which
authorized the use of pen registers to monitor a suspected illegal
gambling enterprise. 113 The Court held that the district court's order
fell under the provisions of the All Writs Act, which provides: "The
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.""
' 14
The district court issued the injunction after finding there was
probable cause to conclude an illegal gambling enterprise was being
conducted at a particular location.' 15 After refusing to comply with
the parts of the order that required the Company to lease lines to the
FBI and to offer technical assistance, the Company moved the
district court to vacate those portions of the order. 116  The FBI
determined that it would not be able to set up its operation and
effectively monitor the gambling enterprise if the Company did not
comply with the order.
117
The Supreme Court first recognized the district court's power to
implement the pen register order under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41.1'8 The issue was whether the assistance of the
Company, which was necessary to the implementation of the order,
could be compelled under the All Writs Act to "effectuate and
prevent the frustration of [its] orders." ' 19 The Court observed that
the All Writs Act had served since its original inclusion in the
112. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 171-75 (1977).
113. Id. at 161-62.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
115. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162.
116. Id. at 163.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 168-69.
119. Id. at 172.
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Judiciary Act as a "legislatively approved source of procedural
instruments designed to achieve the 'rational ends of law.' ' 120 The
Act could be used to prevent the frustration of orders it had
previously issued in exercising jurisdiction it had otherwise obtained
(i.e., jurisdiction obtained on a basis other than on the All Writs Act
itself), 121 unless Congress limited this power. 12 2 In this case, because
the district court had the power to issue the pen register order under
FRCP 41, and because the Company's assistance was necessary to
implement that order, the All Writs Act provided the authority to
issue an order compelling the Company to comply.
123
This case demonstrates the unique power of the All Writs Act to
affect parties who are not otherwise party to a cause of action. The
Court found that the Company was not a third party so far removed
from the underlying controversy in the case that the district court
could not compel its assistance. 124 The power that the All Writs
Act confers upon federal courts "extends, under appropriate
circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original
action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the
implementation of a court order or the proper administration of
justice.'
125
The Court noted that a federal court's power under the All Writs
Act is limited when Congress has appropriately confined such
action. 126 Therefore, where another statute conflicts with a federal
court's power under the All Writs Act, the federal court must yield to
Congress's intent. In the context of on going state court litigation,
the Anti-Injunction Act, as illustrated in Atlantic Coast Line,
127
represents Congress's intent that, as a general rule, federal courts
should not interfere. The next section examines the interaction
between these acts, how they have been interpreted to allow federal
courts to issue injunctions aimed at state court proceedings in multi-
120. Id.
121. See id. at 172-73; cf supra Part VI.B.4 (explaining that the All Writs
Act does not provide an independent basis of jurisdiction supporting removal).
122. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 172-73.
123. Id. at 172.
124. Id. at 174.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 172-73.
127. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
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district class actions, and recent developments that may further
empower federal courts to preserve their interests as against parallel
state proceedings.
D. Current Trends
1. The courts
When applicable, the Anti-Injunction Act acts as a limit on the
broad provision of authority granted to federal courts by the All
Writs Act. 128 The Anti-Injunction Act, however, is only implicated
in reference to state court proceedings that are already underway.
129
Therefore, in situations such as In re Baldwin-United Corp.
130
(considered earlier), the Act technically does not apply because the
district court issued an injunction before any suits were commenced
in state court.131 On the other hand, the All Writs Act embodies a
much broader grant of authority to federal courts. 32 Its authorization
to issue writs necessary or appropriate in aid of the federal court's
jurisdiction is not limited to state proceedings that are already
underway. Even though the Anti-Injunction Act does not technically
apply to state proceedings that are not yet underway, federal courts
have nevertheless used cases interpreting the Anti-Injunction Act's
128. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir. 2002).
129. The Anti-Injunction Act is worded in terms of staying proceedings in a
state court, which necessarily implies that state proceedings have already been
instituted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
130. 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985); see supra Part VI.B.3.a.
131. The injunction in Baldwin-United enjoined the state of New York from
filing a suit that was imminent. See 770 F.2d at 338; see also Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965) (the Anti-Injunction Act does "not
preclude injunctions against the institution of state court proceedings, but only
bar[s] stays of suits already instituted.").
132. The grant of authority under the All Writs Act extends well beyond the
area of federal and state court interaction. It has been used for a wide array of
purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 220-22 (1952)
(holding that the All Writs Act provided the district court authority to order a
federal prisoner to be produced in court for a hearing); Chandler v. Judicial
Council, 398 U.S. 74, 112 (1970) (stating that the All Writs Act provided the
Supreme Court the authority to order lower federal court to further exercise its
jurisdiction) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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"necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to understand the
meaning of similar language in the All Writs Act. 
133
a. interaction between the Anti-Injunction and
All Writs Acts-Baldwin-United
Recall that in Baldwin-United, the federal district court had
reached stipulations of settlement for 18 of 26 broker-dealer
defendants who were being sued for securities violations by
approximately 100,000 plaintiffs, whose suits had been consolidated
into one federal class action.1 34  The district court issued an
injunction as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction under the All Writs
Act, enjoining imminent proceedings in New York state court that
threatened to undermine the federal settlement.1 35 Since no suits had
actually been commenced in state court, the Anti-Injunction Act was
technically inapplicable as a limit on the federal court's ability to
issue the injunction under the All Writs Act.1 36 Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit considered cases interpreting the "necessary in aid of
jurisdiction" clause of the Act to understand the meaning of the All
Writs Act. 137 The court noted that the clause permits a district court
to enjoin actions in state court to prevent relitigation of issues
relating to an existing federal judgment, despite the fact that the
parties to the original action could raise res judicata as an affirmative
defense to accomplish the same end.
138
The Court further explained that even before a federal court has
reached a judgment, "the preservation of the federal court's
jurisdiction or authority over an ongoing matter may justify an
injunction against actions in state court."' 139 Such a situation occurs
when state court action would so interfere "'with a federal court's
consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the
133. See Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d at 335.
134. See id. at 331; see also supra Part VI.B.3.a.
135. See Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d at 333.
136. See id. at 335.
137. Id.
138. Id. The power to enjoin state proceedings granted to federal courts
under the All Writs Act is more powerful than the res judicata defense because
the All Writs Act can stop litigation before it even starts, while res judicata can
only be raised once litigation has commenced.
139. Id.
1625
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37:1603
federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case."",
140
While the mere existence of a parallel lawsuit in state court seeking
to adjudicate the same in personam claim does not by itself provide
sufficient grounds for a federal court to issue an injunction, the court
held that in this case the district court appropriately found that the
maintenance of the actions in state court would significantly impair
its jurisdiction and authority over the consolidated federal
multidistrict action. 141 In this case, "the potential for an onslaught of
state actions posed more than a risk of inconvenience or duplicative
litigation;" the proposed litigation "threatened to 'seriously impair
the federal court's flexibility and authority' to approve settlements in
the multi-district litigation."'
' 42
The court characterized the district court proceedings as
substantial in scope, as having consumed vast amounts of judicial
time, and as nearing completion. 143 Further, multiple state actions
would frustrate the district court's efforts to craft a settlement since
the success of any settlement arrived at was to be dependent on the
parties' ability to agree to release any and all related civil claims the
plaintiffs had against defendants. 44 If states could derivatively
assert the same claims that were the subject of the settlement on
behalf of class members, there could be no certainty about the
finality of a federal settlement, and "[a]ny substantial risk of this
prospect would threaten all of the settlement efforts by the district
court and destroy the utility of the multi-district forum otherwise
ideally suited to resolving such broad claims.' 145 The court also
noted that principles of federalism and comity are not disturbed by
issuing injunctive relief in cases such as this, where impending state
140. Id. (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
U.S. 281, 295 (1970)).
141. 1d. at 336.
142. Id. at 337.
143. Id. The court also took into consideration that out of approximately
100,000 plaintiffs who were parties to the consolidated federal class action
only fifty chose to opt out of the settlement. Id. Further, the court noted that
the Baldwin-United defendants' bankruptcy had occurred two years earlier, but
the states had waited until a federal settlement was almost finalized before
taking significant action against the defendants and threatening to institute suit
in their representational capacity. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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court suits are vexatious and harassing. 146  As a result of these
considerations the Baldwin Court concluded that the "injunction
protecting the settling defendants was unquestionably 'necessary or
appropriate in aid of' the federal court's jurisdiction."
' 147
The Baldwin-United court found that the injunction was
appropriately necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction
under the All Writs Act (and as the same language is interpreted in
the Anti-Injunction Act) despite the fact that state court proceedings
had not yet begun. All Writs injunctions can also be issued in cases
where parallel state court litigation is already underway if it satisfies
one of the three exceptions of the Anti-Injunction Act.
b. interaction between the Anti-Injunction and All
Writs Acts-Diet Drugs
In cases where the Anti-Injunction Act is applicable-i.e., when
state court proceedings are already underway-a federal court must
first satisfy one of the three exceptions allowed by Congress under
the Anti-Injunction Act before enjoining a state court proceeding in
aid of its jurisdiction under the All Writs Act.' 4 8 The Anti-Injunction
Act is a limit on the All Writs Act. 14 9 There has been a recent trend,
however, to allow federal district courts to enjoin parallel class
action state court proceedings under the authority of the All Writs
Act in situations that traditionally would not have been understood as
meeting one of the narrow exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.1
50
Appellate courts have reinterpreted the Anti-Injunction Act's
146. Id. The court analogized the circumstances of the case to an in rem
action, which was the traditional basis for the "necessary in aid" exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act, because it was a situation where it is intolerable to
have conflicting orders from different courts. See supra note 97.
147. Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d at 338. The court does note that if the
settlement process were to break down or if it appeared that prompt settlement
of the matter was no longer likely, that the injunction against parallel actions
might be lifted since state court proceedings cannot be enjoined "merely
because they are duplicative of actions being heard in federal court." Id.
148. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs., 398 U.S. 281, 286
(1970).
149. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir. 2002).
150. See Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of Judicial Activism: Removal
Under the All Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REv. 773, 785-92 (2000).
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"necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to give federal courts
more power to protect their interests by use of the All Writs Act.
151
Without explicitly saying so, the Court of Appeals opinions that
have upheld such district court injunctions appear to use the All
Writs Act to effect a broader reading of the Anti-Injunction Act's
exceptions in the name of the federal interest in the efficient
resolution of exceedingly complex multi-district litigation. A more
cynical interpretation of this trend is that the courts are using the All
Writs Act to do an "end-run" around the strict requirements of the
Anti-Injunction Act.1
52
Recall that the district court in In re Diet Drugs Products
Liability Litigation enjoined a Texas State court from approving a
mass opt out of federal class plaintiffs in multi-district mass tort
litigation.' 53 The opt out would have undermined the federal court's
ability to achieve a global settlement.' 54 Because the case involved
state proceedings already underway, the Anti-Injunction Act limited
the broad grant of authority to the district court under the All Writs
Act.1 55 An exception to the Anti-Injunction Act had to apply before
an injunction could be issued under the All Writs Act. Because
the parties did not argue that the injunction met the first
exception--expressly authorized by Congress-or the third
exception-necessary to protect or effectuate its judgments-the
Court only considered whether the injunction met the second
exception: "necessary in aid of jurisdiction.'
1 56
151. See, e.g., Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d at 335.
152. See Steinman, supra note 150, at 815-24.
153. See supra Part VI.B.3.b. In resolving whether the injunction issued by
the federal court was appropriate in this case, the Third Circuit first addressed
and rejected the appellant's argument that their second attempt at removing the
Texas Gonzalez case to federal court was effective and that the state court's
jurisdiction was defeated before it ordered the opt out. Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at
232. The Court noted that this "illustrate[d] the remarkable extent to which
lawsuits can be turned into procedural entanglements" where "legal jockeying
employed by both sides exhibits a proclivity to attempt to manipulate the rules
for immediate tactical advantage." Id. Instead of entering the "tenebrous
world of procedural machinations" the Court went on to consider the
substantive arguments raised as to the validity of the injunction. Id. at 231-32.
154. Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 236-39.
155. Id. at 233 ("The power granted by the All Writs Act is limited by the
Anti-Injunction Act."); see supra Part VI.C. 1.
156. See Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 233.
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Historically, the necessary in aid of jurisdiction exception was
applied primarily in situations where a res (or property) was at
stake. 157 The Third Circuit acknowledged the traditional notion that
"'in personam actions in federal and state court may proceed
concurrently, without interference from either court, and [that] there
is no evidence that the exception to § 2283 was intended to alter this
balance."",15 8 The Third Circuit nonetheless read the "necessary in
aid of jurisdiction" exception broadly enough to cover parallel in
personam actions under unique circumstances. The Court observed
that while it may not be enough that state action "risk[s] some
measure of inconvenience or duplicative litigation,"' 59 a court may
issue an injunction where "'the state court action threatens to
frustrate proceedings and disrupt the orderly resolution of the federal
litigation."16
0
The Third Circuit has recognized a category of federal cases,
beyond res cases, where state actions present a special threat to the
federal court's jurisdiction. 16 1 In Carlough v. Amchem Products,
Inc.,' 62 it found that a federal court could appropriately enjoin state
court proceedings to protect its jurisdiction where the federal case
involved complex litigation, especially litigation involving a
substantial class of persons from multiple states or a consolidation of
cases from multiple districts. 63 It reasoned that complex nationwide
cases make special demands on the flexibility and authority of
federal courts that may justify an injunction otherwise prohibited by
the Anti-Injunction Act.164 The threat in this context is compounded
157. See supra note 97 (discussing the history of the "necessary in aid of
jurisdiction" exception).
158. See Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 234 (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend
Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977)).
159. Id. (citing In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 337 (2d Cir.
1985)).
160. Id. (quoting Winkler v. Eli Lilly Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir.
1996)).
161. See cases cited infra note 185.
162. 10 F.3d 189 (3d. Cir. 1993).
163. Id. at 198; see Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 235.
164. Carlough, 10 F.3d at 198. The court notes cases in other circuits where
justices have concurred in this conclusion. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998); Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465, 1470 (1 1th Cir.
1993); Three J Farms, Inc. v. Plaintiffs' Steering Comm. (In re Corrugated
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where there are conditional class certifications and impending
settlements in federal actions.' 65 These cases involve an enormous
amount of time and expenditure of resources as the federal court
seeks to forge a solution where the parties seek complicated,
comprehensive settlements in order to resolve as many claims as
possible in one proceeding. 166 As such, these complex cases are
especially vulnerable to "parallel state actions that may 'frustrate the
district court's efforts to craft a settlement in the multi-district
litigation before it."" 
67
The Diet Drugs court found that the Gonzalez state action posed
such a threat to the federal court's jurisdiction. First, the Court
considered the nature of the federal action itself. The action was the
consolidation of over two thousand cases filed in or removed to
federal court, comprising a finally certified federal class of six
million members.1 68 The district court and the parties expended two
years of "exhaustive work" toward reaching a settlement.169 The
district court issued over a thousand orders in the case. 170  The
district court employed careful management during that time to keep
the "enormously complicated" settlement process on track.171 Given
the careful balancing the district court performed to bring about a
settlement, any state court action that might interfere with the court's
settlement oversight seriously threatened its ability to manage the
final stages of the complex litigation. 1
72
Container Antitrust Litig.), 659 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
The court also makes special note of a class of cases that analogize complex
litigation cases to actions in rem. See supra note 97; cf Bennett v. Medtronic,
Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 806-07 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the action did not fall
within the limited class of in personam cases that courts have exempted from
the restriction of the Anti-Injunction Act, and stating that otherwise courts
would run the danger of effectively eliminating parallel or related federal and
state proceedings).
165. Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 236.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Carlough, 10 F.3d at 203).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 236-37.
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In addition to the nature of the federal action itself, the Third
Circuit also considered the nature of the state court action in
determining whether the state proceeding posed a sufficient threat to
justify an injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act despite the Anti-
Injunction Act's prohibition.' 73 The court found that the Texas state
court's opt out order, contrary to a previous district court order,
would directly affect the identity of the parties making up the federal
class.' 74 In addition, the Texas court's order would make it difficult
to distinguish which action members of both the federal and state
classes were actually party to. 175 The court also noted that because
injunctions must be "'necessary in aid of jurisdiction"' to fall under
the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the injunctions must be
narrowly tailored to meet the needs of the case. 176 The court found
this requirement was met since the district court's order only
enjoined the mass opt out; it did not prevent individual Gonzalez
plaintiffs from opting out.
177
Finally, the court considered federalism. 7 8 It weighed heavily
the fact that Texas plaintiffs who wished to opt out of the federal
class could still do so in their individual capacities. 79 They retained
the option to commence individual lawsuits in the forums of their
choice.' 80 The federal court order would not interfere with this type
of state court proceeding.' 8' It further noted that the injunction did
not interfere with the state court proceeding itself, as it only
prevented the application of state court orders directed at the federal
action.
82
173. See id. at 234, 237.
174. Id. at 237.
175. Id. at 237-38.
176. Id. at 238.
177. See id. The court distinguished its earlier decision in Carlough v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1993), where it upheld a
substantially broader injunction that effectively stayed the entire parallel state
action, rather than only an attempted opt out or other portions of the order
aimed squarely at the federal action. Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 238.
178. Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 239.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.; see also Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus. Inc., 825 F.2d 634,
639 (2d Cir. 1987) ("While the Anti-Injunction Act is designed to avoid
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In considering the interaction between the Anti-Injunction and
All Writs Acts, the court stated, "since the parallel 'necessary in aid
of jurisdiction' language is construed similarly in both the All Writs
Act and the Anti-Injunction Act, a finding that an injunction is
'necessary in aid' of jurisdiction for purposes of one of these statutes
implies its necessity for purposes of the other."'183 This construction
runs counter to the historically narrow construction of the "necessary
in aid of jurisdiction" exception under the Anti-Injunction Act, which
was in fact generally applied to situations where property was held
by the court. 184 This illustrates a recent trend in appellate opinions
regarding the All Writs Act's application in multi-district class
actions. 85. While the courts purport to require that an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act be met-specifically the "necessary in aid of
jurisdiction" exception-before an injunction can issue under the
authority of the All Writs Act, they do not conduct a standard
analysis.
The courts have essentially used the broad interpretation of this
language under the All Writs Act to effect a broader reading
of the Anti-Injunction Act's exception.' 86  This is a noteworthy
phenomenon, considering how narrow Congress intended the Anti-
disharmony between federal and state systems, the exception in § 2283 reflects
congressional recognition that injunctions may sometimes be necessary in
order to avoid that disharmony.").
183. Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 239 (quoting Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
10 F.3d 189, 201 n.9).
184. See discussion supra note 97.
185. See, e.g., In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 159
F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d
1011, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998); White v. Nat'l Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 409
(8th Cir. 1994); Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. (In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 (2d Cir. 1993).
186. The three main types of multi-district class actions where use of the All
Writs Act to enjoin parallel state court proceedings threatening the federal
court's jurisdiction has been upheld are mass tort, securities, and consumer
protection cases. Diet Drugs was a mass tort case. In re Baldwin-United
Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985), was a consolidated complex class action
that dealt with securities. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998), was a consumer protection
case where the court recognized the legitimacy of using the All Writs Act in
the consumer protection context despite the fact that the issuance of an All
Writs injunction in that case was found to be inappropriate where the federal
settlement was struck down by the court of appeal.
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Injunction Act's exceptions to be. 187  It is a reflection of the
importance federal courts place on their ability to protect federal
jurisdiction in "complex cases where certification or settlement has
received conditional approval, or perhaps even where settlement is
pending, [since] the challenges facing the overseeing court are such
that it is likely that almost any parallel litigation in other fora
presents a genuine threat. ,,88 This reinterpretation of the Anti-
Injunction Act exception allows federal courts more latitude and
therefore greater ability to protect their interests by use of the All
Writs Act.
c. limits on the use of the All Writs Act--General Motors Corp. Pick-
Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation
The preceding cases reflect the willingness of federal courts to
issue All Writs injunctions to protect the federal settlement process.
The critical distinction between these cases and cases where All
Writs injunctions are disallowed is that these cases involve complex
class actions where a settlement was reached or was close to being
reached. 189 A party will not be successful in obtaining an injunction
against parallel state court proceedings in non-complex cases, the
early stages of complex cases, or even in cases where a settlement
has been set aside by the court of appeals. 190 Efficiency policy
concerns are not as strongly implicated in those situations.
A party will be unable to secure an injunction against parallel
state court proceedings if a settlement entered into by parties to a
federal class action has been set aside. The Third Circuit disallowed
use of the All Writs Act to enjoin parallel state court proceedings in
this situation in General Motors, a consumer protection case.'
9 1
General Motors involved a nationwide class of plaintiff truck owners
seeking damages and injunctive relief for the allegedly defective
design of certain GM truck fuel systems, which created a high risk of
187. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
287 (1970) ("[T]he exceptions [to § 2283] should not be enlarged by loose
statutory construction.").
188. Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d at 236.
189. See Vairo, supra note 1, at 355-69.
190. See id.
191. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
134 F.3d 133 (3d. Cir. 1998).
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fire following side collisions.' 92 The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania previously certified a nationwide class and
approved a settlement whereby class members were to receive
$1,000 coupons that could be redeemed within 15 months to buy a
new GM truck, and attorneys for the class were to receive $9.5
million in attorney's fees.' 93 Objectors within the class, however,
appealed to the Third Circuit, which determined that the district court
erred in certifying the nationwide settlement class of General Motors
truck owners. 194 The Third Circuit vacated the class certification
order and set aside the settlement, but left open the possibility that
the district court could cure the defect in the certification procedure,
re-certify the class, and get the revised settlement approved on
remand.
195
Instead of proceeding in federal court, however, the parties to
the federal settlement restructured their deal with defendant General
Motors and submitted it to a Louisiana state court, where a similar
class action had been pending, but had not been removed to federal
court. 196  The restructured settlement provided marginally better
terms for the class, and over $26 million in attorney's fees. 197 The
Louisiana state court preliminarily approved the new settlement and
provisionally certified the 5.7 million member nationwide class.
198
Counsel for the class members who had objected to the federal
settlement attempted to derail the Louisiana proceeding by
simultaneously removing the state court action and seeking an
injunction by the federal court under the All Writs Act against the
192. Id. at 137.
193. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig. 55 F.3d 768, 782 (3d Cir. 1995). The nationwide class the district court
certified composed 5.7 million registered truck owners, 5,200 of which opted
out of the class and 6,500 of which objected to the settlement. Gen. Motors
Corp., 134 F.3d at 138.
194. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 139. The Third Circuit determined that
the district court failed to make required class findings of "numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation" as required by
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 718 So. 3d 480, 509 (La. App. 1998).
198. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 139.
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parties proceeding in state court. 199 They argued that the Louisiana
state settlement was an "end run" around, and a violation of, the
jurisdiction of the district court to which the Third Circuit had
remanded the case.200 The Third Circuit responded that although the
procedure followed by the parties to the settlement gave them pause,
precedent compelled them to find there was no relief available under
the All Writs Act.20'
An injunction was inappropriate under the All Writs Act
because no exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applied. The
Appellants did not argue that an injunction was expressly authorized
in the situation by an act of Congress. 20 2 They argued that either the
relitigation exception or the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction"
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applied.20 3 As to the relitigation
exception, the court found that while the district court would have
been bound on remand to apply the precepts it announced in order to
properly certify the class, their decision did not have res judicata or
collateral estoppel effect on other jurisdictions.20 4 The court noted
that denial of class certification is not a "judgment" for purposes of
the Anti-Injunction Act and that their decision rejecting the
provisional federal settlement class was not a judgment with respect
205to the Louisiana settlement agreement.
The court also found the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction"
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable. 20 6 It distinguished
precedent allowing injunctions to be issued under the exception as
applying to cases where the federal court had already approved a
provisional settlement or such approval was imminent, where the
federal court had expended considerable time and resources, and
where the parallel state action threatened to derail the provisional
199. See id. at 137-41.
200. Id. at 137.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 144 n.5; see also supra note 96 (discussing the expressly
authorized exception).
203. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 144-45.
204. Id. at 145.
205. Id. at 146. The court also noted that its interpretation of Rule 23, the
federal rule of civil procedure governing class actions, is not binding on the
Louisiana state court. Id.
206. Id. at 144-45.
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settlement.20 7  In the instant case, the court noted there was "no
class-wide settlement pending before the district court... and no
stipulation of settlement or prospect of settlement [in the district
court was] imminent., 20 8 Further, the court pointed out that if the
Louisiana court approved the settlement "then the nationwide class
[would] be certified [and] no court [would] have any plaintiffs left
with which to proceed. 20 9  If the settlement was ultimately
disapproved by the Louisiana state court, then the district court
would be within its power to continue discovery. 210 Efficiency
concerns that might call for an expanded interpretation of the
'necessary in aid of jurisdiction' exception, such as in In re Diet
Drugs, did not exist in this case, therefore an injunction was
barred.211
General Motors illustrates federal courts' unwillingness to issue
All Writs injunctions staying parallel state proceedings in complex
cases where a federal settlement is not imminent. Since the court
was less concerned with efficiency being undermined, it performed a
standard Anti-Injunction Act analysis, under which federalism
concerns demanded that the federal court not interfere with parallel
state proceedings. Since the court found the appellants' requested
injunction did not fall under any of the three exceptions to the Anti-
Injunction Act, the district court did not have positive power to issue
an injunction under the All Writs Act.
212
d. have efficiency policy concerns won the day?
Despite the Anti-Injunction Act's proscription against federal
courts staying state proceedings, use of the All Writs Act to enjoin
parallel state court proceedings as "necessary in aid of' federal
207. Id. at 145.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Because the Louisiana state court had already entered a final judgment
in the settlement, the Third Circuit also found that its review was barred by the
Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), and the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 138, 141-43.
212. Gen. Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 138, 144. The court also noted that the
federal court did not have personal jurisdiction over the almost 5.7 million
absentee plaintiffs who were not before that court. Id. at 140-41.
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courts' jurisdiction have gained wide acceptance in appellate courts
213across the country. This has occurred in complex cases where a
settlement has been entered, conditionally approved, or is even
merely pending.214 The circuit courts of appeal seem to understand
that parallel state court litigation can present a genuine threat to the
jurisdiction of the federal court.215 If this is correct, parties to
complex class action litigation can expect federal courts to be
proactive in protecting their jurisdiction against attempts to
circumvent federal settlements and judgments by filing competing
actions in state court.
Parties should be wary, however, of the possibility that the U.S.
Supreme Court could step in and change this. Notably, the Court has
not yet ruled on whether this use of the All Writs Act is proper. The
Court's recent federalism cases and its decision in Syngenta raise
questions about whether the Supreme Court would uphold this use of
the All Writs Act and such a broad reading of the Anti-Injunction
Act.
216
The Court's choice not to take up the issue of injunctions issued
against state court proceedings that threaten a federal court's
jurisdiction in complex class actions may reflect some affinity for the
efficiency policy concern. The Court has already foreclosed All
Writs removal as a means for federal courts to protect their
jurisdiction in such cases.2 17 The Court may therefore be hesitant to
eliminate All Writs injunctions as a means for federal courts to
protect settlement proceedings from being derailed by parallel state
court action.
While one must be careful not to read the Court's avoidance of
the matter to be an endorsement of All Writs injunctions, the
practical effect of allowing the practice to continue is important. As
the only federal court with inherent power to review state court
decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one body that does not have
a vested interest in allowing or not allowing All Writs injunctions to
213. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 282 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2002).
214. See, e.g., id. at 236.
215. See, e.g., id.
216. See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002);
Garnett, supra note 15, at 11-23.
217. See Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 31-34.
1637
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1603
be issued against state court proceedings. It does not have to worry
about its jurisprudential efforts being undermined because it is the
ultimate Court of review. It is therefore in a position to weigh loftier
concerns of what should and should not be allowed in the nation's
dual court system. In cases the Court has taken up in recent years, it
has elevated federalism above efficiency concerns.
218
Despite any concern the Court may have had in Syngenta with
eliminating All Writs removal as a means for lower federal courts to
protect their jurisdiction, the need for separation between state and
federal court systems won out.2 19 There had been a considerable
split between the circuits as to the propriety of All Writs removal.22 °
In the context of issuing All Writs injunctions there is much more
uniformity.22' The lower federal courts have in essence agreed that
efficiency concerns justify the issuance of injunctions under the All
Writs Act as a means of protecting their jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court's choice not to consider the issue has left the decision to the
individual circuits, effectively allowing federal courts to use the All
Writs Act to issue injunctions against parallel state court proceedings
in complex class actions. Though the Court has been staunchly
federalist, this illustrates some sensitivity to efficiency in the
complex litigation context.
As the law stands now, parties to complex class action litigation
can expect federal courts to be very protective of their jurisdiction,
especially as they approach the point of reaching a settlement. A
plaintiff class in such a situation can attempt to initiate parallel
litigation in state court, but is likely to be enjoined unless the federal
settlement process has suffered a deficiency or has completely
218. See Part VI.B.4.
219. See Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32-34.
220. Compare VMS Ltd. P'ship Sec. Litig. v. Prudential Sec. Inc. (In re
VMS Sec. Litig.) 103 F.3d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir. 1996), and Sable v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996), and Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co. (In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.), 996 F.2d 1425, 1431
(2d Cir. 1993) (circuits that upheld All Writs injunctions), with Hillman v.
Webley, 115 F.3d 1461 (10th Cir. 1997), Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261
F.3d 1065 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (circuits that disallowed All Writs removal).
221. See cases cited supra note 185.
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broken down.222 They may derive some hope from the fact that the
Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence, and indeed the history of the
Anti-Injunction Act, indicates the Court is inclined to allow state
proceedings to proceed without interference by federal courts.
However, the Court's unwillingness to consider the issue of All
Writs injunctions issued against state court proceedings by federal
courts indicates sympathy for the efficiency concerns underlying
such action, and signifies an unwillingness to strike these injunctions
down.
2. The legislature
District courts and circuit courts of appeal are not alone in
taking steps to expand federal court authority to further federal
interests of efficiency and justice in the area of multi-district class
action litigation. The House of Representatives recently approved
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003,223 which is currently awaiting
approval in the Senate. The current draft of the bill would, inter alia,
ease the complete diversity requirements of the section 1332
diversity statute in class actions where the amount in controversy
exceeds five million dollars.224 Under the Act, the complete
diversity requirement would be met in the case of a class action, thus
providing for original or removal jurisdiction in federal court, where:
(A) any member of [the] class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a
State different from any defendant; (B) any member of a
class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of
a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State
and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of
a foreign state.
22 5
222. Recall that the problem is with an entire class or a large subsection
thereof filing parallel actions in state court. Individual plaintiffs, of course,
have the option to opt out of the class action and pursue state remedies.
223. H.R. 1115, 108thCong. (2003).
224. Id. at § 4; see also supra Parts II, V.B. 1.
225. H.R. 1115§4.
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The Act also gives district courts discretion to decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a class action where the government's
interests are not implicated.226
A motivation behind the Class Action Fairness Act is to give
federal courts jurisdiction in class actions where state court judges
have too hastily certified classes and approved settlements. 227 In
Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson,228 the Supreme Court
eliminated All Writs removal, which was one of the means federal
courts had been using to protect federal interests in the class action
context. The Class Action Fairness Act can therefore be seen, at
least in part, as a response to the Court's elimination of All Writs
removal as a means of protecting federal courts' efforts to achieve
global settlement in multi-district class actions.229
E. Conclusion
Parties to complex class action litigation have much riding on
the determination of whether they can proceed in state versus federal
court. The current interpretation of a federal court's power under the
All Writs Act to protect its jurisdiction in these cases should give
class action defendants some peace of mind in knowing they are
protected from malcontent plaintiffs mounting attacks in parallel
state court proceedings on imminent or pending federal settlements.
At the same time, there is some hope for complex class action
plaintiffs who want to pursue state court remedies because they are
unhappy with the way a federal court has handled the case. If it is
early in the federal settlement process, or a version of a settlement
has been ruled deficient, such plaintiffs are not estopped from
226. Id. The resolution sets forth five factors for the court to consider in
determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction or to decline to take
jurisdiction. Id.
227. See Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 301 (2003) (recounting
witness testimony before committee members who spoke to this problem and
proposed the solution that class actions be federalized "as a means of reining in
wayward state court judges and plaintiffs' lawyers").
228. 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
229. See Resnik, supra note 227, at 298-303.
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pursuing alternative settlement negotiations in a state court with
jurisdiction over the case.
230
Also, although the U.S. Supreme Court has not specifically
taken up this issue, its recent rulings indicate that it is more
concerned with federalism principles than those of efficiency. If so,
it is possible that the Court may choose to speak on the propriety of
federal courts' use of All Writs injunctions to enjoin parallel state
court proceedings. To date, the Court has deferred to the judgment
of the circuits to give district courts this power in the name of
efficiency; however, it may choose to eliminate these injunctions as
inconsistent with their precedent interpreting the prohibition of the
Anti-Injunction Act. The Court might also be more willing to strike
down the federal court practice of issuing All Writs injunctions if
Congress approves the Class Action Fairness Act, which would give
federal courts broader power to protect their interests by expanding
their subject matter jurisdiction. 3
230. Of course, the requirements of personal and subject matter jurisdiction
must be met, and it must be a case where the federal court has not attained
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. See supra Parts II (diversity
jurisdiction), III (federal question jurisdiction).
231. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
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